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DNA and the Congressional Prerogatives:
Proposals for a Deliberate Legislative Approach
to Genetic Research
The focus of recombinant DNA' research is the removal of a gene with a
specific characteristic from one organism and the subsequent transplanting of
it into another to produce a desired change. Despite the potential benefits envisioned by genetic engineers,2 considerable public skepticism still surrounds
3
DNA research.
Some DNA experiments
have a real streak of the macbre, if not the downright malevolent. It may be
scientifically intriguing to grow a human baby in a test tube; it may be
equally so to fuse a human and a gorilla cell to try to grow the resulting
hybrid. Indeed, it may be very easy to justify this with cold logic or blithe irrationality.... But while these 4possibilities are wonderful to some, they are
downright frightening to others.
Since many members of the scientific community and the American
public foresee the inevitable escape of deadly organisms from the laboratorys
and their subsequent transmission across political boundaries, federal regulation is essential. This note proposes severe congressional circumscription of
DNA experimentation until more is known about operational safeguards and
the actual hazards associated with genetic engineering. Substantive proposals
for permanent federal DNA legislation are suggested, as well as an alternative
under which states would adopt their own regulatory safeguards.

'Each living cell contains at least one chromosome whose essential component is DNA.
This molecule is shaped like a double spiral and is composed of smaller segments called genes.
These genes determine the organism's heredity properties. In addition, bacterial cells may also
contain smaller DNA groupings called plasmids, which are relatively easy to handle in
laboratories. They are also capable of entering other bacterial cells.
By using a substance called a restriction enzyme, scientists can split a plasmid into specific
fragments, which have an important property: They will adhere to other DNA fragments with
which they come in contact. Thus, if plasmids from two different organisms are split and the
resulting fragments are mixed, they may "recombine" into a hybrid plasmid, bearing some of the
characteristics of both original organisms.
To grow quantities of this hybrid, scientists can mix it with bacterial cells that will absorb
the new plasmid and duplicate it at an enormous rate. Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Nov.
14, 1976, Section D-E, at 1, col. 1.
2For an enumeration of the possible benefits of DNA research, see Recombinant DNA
Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27902, at 27904 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NIH Guidelines].
'U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April 11, 1977, at 80 [hereinafter cited as U.S. NEws].
4J. GOODFIELD. PLAYING GOD 70 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GODFIELD].
'U.S. NEws. supra note 3, at 80.
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THE RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH CONTROVERSY

After organisms mate, copies of the genetic material appear within a
single cell. In most organisms, this genetic material is deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA). By natural processes, segments of the nucleic acid molecules from the
two parental organisms are exchanged. This process is called genetic recombination since it leads to a reassortment of genetic material derived from the
parental organisms by generating daughter organisms with new combinations
of genes. In nature, recombination is restricted by mating and species boundaries. 6 However, within the last decade, biochemical methods have been
developed which allow DNA molecules of completely unrelated species to be
joined together. An integral, yet controversial, ingredient of the current
research technique is the colon bacillus Escherichia coli (E coli), one of the
Earth's most pervasive microorganisms. Scientists selected E coli as the
research host cell because a great deal is known about the genetics of one of
its strains, K-12, which was isolated 60 years ago and has been in continuous
laboratory use ever since. 7 But while E coli is commonly used in DNA experimentation, scientists have not reached a consensus as to the relative safety
of the microorganism. For example, noted biologist George Wald is troubled
by the fact that E coli is a constant inhabitant of the human bowel, 8 subjecting man to potential attack by newly developed strains. By contrast, Mark
Ptashne of Harvard's Biological Laboratories and a number of other scientists
reject Wald's skepticism of E coli use. 9 Ptashne observes that no one has yet
managed to transfer genes from pathogenic E coli K-12, which "is not surprising . . ." since "it is no easy matter to confer those multiple properties required for pathogenicity on a non-pathogenic bacterium grown for many
generations in the laboratory."
THE NIH GUIDELINES

On June 23, 1976, Donald S. Fredrickson, director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), issued guidelines on recombinant DNA research. 0
6
Report of the Second Meeting of the EMBO Standing Advisory Committee on Recombinant DNA, Memo NAR-68, at 11 (December 1976) [hereinafter cited as EMBO Standing Committee].
'Hubbard, Gazing into the Crystal Ball, 26 BIOSCIENCE 608 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Hubbard].
'Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, CURRENT. November 1976, at 27
[hereinafter cited as Wald].
'Ptashne, The Defense Doesn't Rest, CURRENT, November 1976, at 30 [hereinafter cited as
Ptashne].
10NIH Guidelines, supra note 2 at 27904. The guidelines were issued as a result of an international meeting at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific Grove, California, in February 1975.
Four lawyers spoke at the conference and laid bare a series of frightening possibilities, not involving human epidemics, but multimillion dollar lawsuits and injunctions against research that
could descend on scientists and the owners of laboratories, whether or not they meant to do
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The standards provide a framework for continuance of recombinant DNA experimentation. They affirm the view that the research is potentially of enormous benefit, but may involve unforseeri risks. "Recombinant DNA research
offers great promise, particularly for improving the understanding and
possibly the treatment of various diseases. There is also a potential risk-that
microorganisms with transplanted genes may prove hazardous to men or
other forms of life.""
Compliance with the guidelines is voluntary, 2 so that their effectiveness
depends largely on the supervision of the NIH, a major federal funding agency. 13 The standards established by the guidelines regulate research directly
sponsored through NIH grants14 but do not limit the DNA experimentation
of private industry, the sector most likely to have a marked impact on the
general public.' The guidelines are comprehensive, especially with regard to
establishing physical and biological containment safeguards. Physical containment procedures range from classification P1 to P4. P1 containment is that
used in most routine bacteriological laboratories. P2 and P3 afford increasing
isolation of the research from the environment while P4 represents the most
extreme measures used for containing virulent pathogens and permits no
escape of contaminated air, wastes or untreated materials.' 6 Biological conharm. The scientists were told that the research may very will fit into the legal category of
"ultrahazardous activity." The scientists and their employers were told they might be responsible
for subsequent damage and they would undoubtedly be liable if the microorganisms made by
recombinant DNA were to escape.
In GOODFIELD..supra note 4, at 144, the author addresses the question of whether DNA experimentation involves abnormally dangerous conduct:
What constitutes "abnormally dangerous" is always a matter of debate, and in court a
list of factors have to be examined to decide the degree of danger. These cover the
severity of the risk; the gravity of the harm; the fact that even by being thoroughly
reasonable, the risk could not be eliminated no matter how hard one tried; the question whether the conduct was common conduct; the appropriateness of the place
where the work was going on; and the value of the activity to the community. In order
to prove "abnormally dangerous conduct," however, not all the factors need to be present, and recombinant DNA research plainly qualifies as "abnormally dangerous conduct" on the first four counts.
"NIH Guidelines, supra note 2 at 27904.
12Id. at 27906.
13SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. LIBRARY OF CON-

GRESS, GENETIC ENGINEERING, HUMAN GENETICS AND CELL BIOLOGY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as HUMAN GENETICS].

"See Rifkin & Howard, Taking Care of Business, NEw TIMES, Jan. 21, 1977.
"See Wald, supra note 8, at 29.
Though there is nothing in the present legislation that imposes the guidelines on industry, there is strong moral pressure . . . In any case, they are at the moment
restricted by certain bans, which prohibit release into the environment of materials or
organisms made by these techniques. To say that industry is unhappy with this state of
affairs is an understatement; they will certainly try to get these restrictions lifted by all
means possible. The moment they have made a valuable product, like human insulin,
and can see the possibility of full-scale commercial application, they will probably try
and get a test case through the courts.
GOODFIELD, supra note 4, at 156-57.
"For the specific requirements of PI containment, see NIH Guidelines, sup-a note 2, at

27912; for P2, see id. at 27913; for P3, see id.; and for P4, see id. at 27913-14.
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tainment is the use of hosts and vectors 7 so that DNA is theoretically incapable of survival under natural conditions.
But while the guidelines, fairfy characterized as moderate,18 permit DNA
research to continue with only the slightest infringement on scientific
autonomy, many researchers have refused to acknowledge their urgency.
"Half of the researchers . . . follow the guidelines fastidiously; others seem to
care little . . . Among the young graduate students and post doctorates it
[seems] almost chic not to know the NIH rules."' 9
With scientists themselves unable to agree on the magnitude of possible
risks in DNA research, 20 Congress should opt for a cautious approach in implementing permanent regulatory legislation.
Arguably, the unlimited potential for prestige and profit-making has
already dissuaded some scientists from making a dispassionate analysis of the
biohazards inherent in genetic research. This is perhaps best demonstrated by
the self-serving nature of the NIH guidelines themselves. "There is a conflict
of interest when scientists, who stand to gain from this work-in terms of
money and prestige-decide that it must be done. There is also a conflict of
interest when NIH, which houses, promotes and sponsors the research,
'
develops guidelines to regulate it. 2
If Congress incorporates the NIH guidelines in toto in permanent legislation, it would be ratifying this scientific impropriety. But regardless of the
manner in which it proceeds, Congress will meet with a groundswell of sentiment22 against circumscription of research autonomy since scientists "have
"A vector is a virus-like entity known as a plasmid, which is used to carry genes of experimental interest in bacterial hosts. A host is an organism that harbors a parasite.
"See Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond the NIH Guidelines, 194 ScIENcE
1133 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Grobstein].
"Hopson, Recombinant lab for DNA and my 95 days in it, 81 SMITHSONIAN 61 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as Hopson].
"0Even prior to implementation of the NIH guidelines:
Opinion differed on whether the proposed guidelines were an appropriate response to
the potential benefits and hazards. Several scientists found the guidelines to so exaggerate the safety procedures that inquiry would be unnecessarily retarded, while others
found the guidelines weighted toward promoting research....
There was strong disagreement about the nature and level of the possible hazards
of recombinant DNA research....
Other commentators, however, found the guidelines to be adequate to the
hazards posed. In their view, the guidelines struck an appropriate balance so that
research could proceed cautiously.
NIH Guidelines, supra note 2, at 27904.
2"Hubbard, supra note 7, at 611.
2"Whether because of public apathy or the relative inaction of Congress to date on the
DNA question, the noisy demonstrations on campuses and elsewhere which made headlines in the
recent past have largely faded away, and about 300 research projects are believed to be underway
right now.
"The clouds have gone, the sun is shining and politically, they are looking at other issues,"
said Daniel J. Hayes, chairman of the Cambridge Experimentation Review Board, in December
1977. He was in the midst of the controversy there over gene splicing research from the summer
bf 1976 through last winter.
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held, and continue to hold, that there is no real external imperative upon
,,2,
them, no ethical core other than the ethics internal to the discipline ....
This is all the more reason why Congress should ignore the scientific caterwauling and proceed to enact strict legislation during the formative years of
DNA experimentation.
Such a government-supported diminution in scientific individualism in
favor of safeguarding the public health was aptly demonstrated a decade ago
in a similar situation where possible escape of pathogenic organisms was at
issue.
Just prior to the launching of Apollo 11 on its historic lunar mission in
1969, scientists and government officials alike were as concerned about the
possible escape of "moon germs" 24 as researchers are today about pathogenic
DNA cells finding their way into the environment. In anticipation of the
moon landing, however, scientific autonomy was effectively subordinated to
the more pressing governmental concern of protection of the public as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) proceeded with extreme caution in formulating plans for containment of microorganisms borne
by "all NASA manned and unmanned space missions which land on or come
within the atmospheric envelope of a celestial body and return to Earth.1 25
Stringent regulations imposing containment requirements were promulgated
and the returning Apollo 11 astronauts were even placed in isolation, 26 a
measure intended to "protect the world against what was considered the
27
unlikely possibility of contamination by lunar organisms."
In addition to displaying the manner in which such cautious methodology
can aid in the resolution of problems posed by potentially hazardous
microorganisms, NASA has consistently demonstrated the benefits which can
result from centralized supervision of scientific efforts28 and from consistent
In spite of the current surface lull, many who have watched and tried to nudge the political
process one way or another are convinced new legislation to set rules and regulations for genetic
engineering will be enacted by the 95th Congress. Political lobbying, particularly on the part of
the scientific community, is expected to be extensive.
2'GOODFIELD.
supra note 4, at 72.
24See the limited edition magazine APOLLO 11: ON THE MOON 54 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as APOLLO 11].
"Extraterrestrial Exposure, 14 C.F.R. § 1211.101 (1977). The NASA administrator or his
designee were empowered to promulgate this section under the provisions of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2455, 2456, 2473 (1971).
2634 Fed. Reg. 12305.
27
APOLLO 11, supra note 24, at 56. This too is the intent of [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2416, Article
IX, Outer Space Treaty, T.I.A.S. No. 6347:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate
measures for this purpose.
21 NASA, by regulation and certainly by administrative design, promotes the participation of
the best qualified scientists in federal projects. The agency encourages researchers to conceive of
specific projects, develop instrumentation for the investigations and participate actively,
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enforcement of restrictive monitoring policies, 29 concerns which now face
federal law-makers.30
wherever possible, in the actual conduct of the experiments. NASA also pushes scientists to
publish their findings as soon as practicable and make their reduced data records available on a
timely basis for use by others. See 14 C.F.R. §1205.101 (1977).
In short, NASA works as an informational clearinghouse, the same function which a newly
authorized federal agency, or a subdivision thereof, could be called upon to serve in regards to
DNA research.
2'With centralized planning and consistent enforcement of monitoring policies, NASA has
made strides toward balancing the scientific desire for autonomy with the national need for comprehensive knowledge concerning worrisome experimental projects. Federalization of genetic
engineering efforts would not only result in a like balance but would also contribute to consistency of policy between jurisdictions.
With scientists currently conducting genetic engineering experiments at over 80 centers
around the nation, the emergence of a qutwork of local legislation was inevitable.
One of the most prominently mentioned feuds involving DNA research was fought in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The conflict was finally resolved on Feb. 7, 1977 when the Cambridge City Council passed a comprehensive city ordinance regulating research. Based on the report of the
Cambridge Experimentation Review Board (CERB), the ordinance allows recombinant DNA
research to proceed, but imposes more stringent safety precautions than those recommended by
the NIH Guidelines. Under the new ordinance, all recombinant DNA research must be conducted in "strict adherence" to the NIH Guidelines. In addition, the ordinance requires that
each institution conducting such research prepare a manual on safety procedures, train
laboratory personnel in appropriate safeguards and procedures for minimizing potential accidents, and "monitor the survival and escape of the host organism or any component thereof in
the lab worker." Researchers are required to test the host organism for purity and also to test
new organisms generated by the experiments to determine their resistance to common antibodies.
In an important expansion of the NIH Guidelines, the ordinance requires that the Institutional
Biohazards Committees include a representative of the laboratory staff and at least one "community representative" unaffiliated with the institution. The City Council also acted upon the
recommendation of the CERB in establishing a Cambridge Biohazards Committee (CBC) to ensure compliance with the ordinance, make on-site lab visits, and review reports of the Institutional Biohazards Committees. In what may be a point of future controversy, the CBC is to
"review all proposals for recombinant DNA research to be conducted in the City of Cambridge
for compliance with the current NIH Guidelines."
Besides eliminating the need for such piecemeal legal attempts at circumscription, uniformity of regulation would also eliminate the potential for experimental "site-shopping." No incentive would exist for scientists to search for those locales which afford the least restrictive DNA experimental standards.
Finally, foreign countries would arguably be more receptive to exchanging experimental information on a nation-to-nation basis than on a nation-to-scientist basis and such global cooperation might well yield unexpected benefits in the field of DNA. NASA certainly has borne out this
theory in regards to space exploration. See, e.g., SPACE WORLD, March 1972, at 35.
5
Enactment of a transcendant body of federal law would permit scientists to know, at least
constructively, the minimum safety standards with which their DNA experiments would have to
comply. Currently, any one of a number of federal adminstrative agencies could arguably promulgate rules dealing with genetic engineering. They include the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Food and Drug Administration, the
Occupational Safety and Health Adminstration and the Environmental Protection Agency.
The characteristics of an adequate legal response to recombinant DNA point to the
need for new federal legislation with implementing regulations to control such research.
The legislation could be relatively short and simple, merely expressing congressional concern and directing the Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate
regulations.
7 ENVTL L. 308 (1977).
While new legislation and regulations would be a desirable response to the hazards of
recombinant DNA research, an interim solution may be found in regulations adopted

1978]

DNA4
PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

An analysis of the initial congressional response to the DNA dilemma indicates that broad-based legislative concerns about potential hazards do exist,
even though no consensus opinion has emerged as to the most beneficial way
to proceed legally. Law-makers introduced twelve bills"' concerning recombinant DNA research during the first session of the 95th Congress. Only two of
them, however, H.R. 789732 and S. 1217,33 have received serious congressional attention.
Senate Bill 1217s proposes the creation of an eleven-member federal
commission to control all recombinant DNA experiments, and an elaborate
system of fines 6 and inspections.3 " As amended, the bill places full responsibility for the promulgation of regulations concerning DNA on the commission.3 7 Initially, however, the NIH guidelines will serve as minimum standards
to which genetic engineering experiments must conform, 38 at least until further study produces permanent legislation. Significantly, S. 1217 provides for
crucial periodic reevaluation of all regulations governing DNA experiments.
[R]esearch with recombinant DNA may not require the same degree of safety
regulation in the future as it does at the present. .

.

. As more becomes

known about the potential hazards of recombinant DNA research, changes in
the safety regulation of the activities may need to be made. It is certainly
possible that as more is known there will be less concern about hazards and
the need for any special safety regulation may disappear. On the other hand,
pursuant to an existing federal statute. Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act of
1944 [42 U.S.C. §264 (1970)] gives the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) the power to make regulations which he judges necessary to "prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases" into the country or between the states. Since one of the major risks of recombinant DNA research is that an
organism might be released into the environment and cause an epidemic, regulations
to prevent such an occurrence seem to come within the words of the statute.
Id. at 310-11.
31H.R. Res. 131, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3191, 95th Cong. 1st Sess (1977); H.R.
3591, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 3592, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4759, 95th Cong.
Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 4848, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5020, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 6158, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 7418, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
7897, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. (1977); S. 621, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1217, 95th Cong. Ist
Sess. (1977).
In addition to these measures, a group of scientists and administrators at Harvard University and other institutions in early 1978 were reported to be drafting a bill for regulation of DNA
research
in the hope that one of the congressional committees would use it as a working draft.
51
H.R. 7897, 95th Cong. 1st Seas. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7897].
3
3S. 1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1217].
3'As amended by the Senate Human Resources Committee. See S. REP. No. 359, 95th Cong.
1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Resources Committee Report].
35 The amount is not to exceed $10,000 for each violation of rules regarding safety precautions. S. 1217, supra note 33, at 45.
31d. at 30.
37Resources Committee Report, supra note 34, at 10.

381d.
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"regulation will

House bill 7897 relegates the task of regulating DNA experimentation to
"local biohazards committees"40 which will operate under the guidance of the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.41 Like S. 1217, H.R. 7897 calls
for federal licensing of research facilities' 2 and provides for the assessment of
fines for statutory violations.' 3 It too makes reference to the NIH guidelines,
mandating that all recombinant DNA experiments undertaken within 18
months of the date of promulgation of the act must be done in compliance
with the guidelines."
Sponsors of the two measures do not contemplate that congressional entry into the field of genetic engineering will necessarily pre-empt all state
authority. Under S. 1217, officials of a state or one of its political subdivisions
may ask the federal commission to waive certain rules concerning DNA
research. The commission may do so if the state's applicable regulation "is,
and will be administered so as to be, as stringent as, or more stringent than"
the federal requirement.' 5 A similar provision in H.R. 789746 permits the
secretary to grant the exemption only after notice and opportunity for an oral
hearing.
7
S. 1217 and H.R. 7897 can be characterized only as interim measures.'
Rather than propose permanent standards, they defer many relevant and difficult decisions until a later time. Such a deliberate congressional approach is
admirable, but law-makers must mandate that scientists comply with strin"9Resources
40

Committee Report, supra note 34, at 11.
These committees, while local in constitution, have only limited authority. See H.R.
7897, supra note 32, at 21. They are subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. And, committee action in regards to the issuance, amendment or
renewal of a license can be reviewed by the secretary upon the written request of any member of
the group.
41d. at 20.
1d. at 10.
4'The amount is not to exceed $5,000 for each violation. Id. at 28.
4Id. at 5.
41S. 1217, supra note 33, at 48. In the normal situation, the "police power," the sovereign
authority to legislate in areas touching on the health and welfare of the citizenry, is reserved to
the states. However, as is noted in 16 C.J.S. CONSTITrrIONAL LAW § 177 (1956). "When the
United States exerts any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection
can be made based on the fact that such exercise may be attended by the same incident which
attends an exercise by the state of its police power." In regard to DNA research, both S. 1217
and H.R. 7897 cite the provisions of the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, as extending
rights of intervention to the federal government. The contention is that DNA molecules could
conceivably
escape from the laboratory and ultimately harm commerce among the states.
4
5H.R. 7897, supra note 32, at 42.

"Under H.R. 7897, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is merely empowered
to promulgate regulations to implement requirements for interim control. H.R. 7897, supra note
32, at 5; for licensing, id. at 11; and for establishment of local biohazards committees, id. at 21.

Under S.1217, the federal commission must prescribe physical and biological containment
requirements for DNA activities within 180 days of the enactment of the statute. S.1217, supra
note 33, at 30.

DNA
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gent standards in the meantime, thereby allowing Congress sufficient time
to make an informed assessement of the scope of permanent legislation required and permitting a margin of safety for future action.
RECOMMENDATIONS
48
Congressional caution in preparing DNA research regulations is crucial.
The time constraints and self-interest pervading the drafting of the NIH
guidelines, 49 around which legislative attempts now center, argue against
their future use to control experimentation where "more is unknown than
known [and] the, repertoire of the techniques are [sic] incomplete." 50
More effective regulation demands implementation of five procedural
restrictions: (1) Development of safer hosts and vectors, (2) Surveillance of
each facility by a full-time medical officer, (3) Institution of P3 containment
as the minimum requirement for future DNA experimentation, (4) Confinement of P4 experiments to a single national laboratory, and (5) Proscription
of the intentional release of mutant cells.
The federal government, through enactment of rigorous permanent
legislation, must promote development of safer hosts and vectors for use in
DNA experimentation. Although the K-12 strain of E coli is environmentally
feeble,9 ' the eventual escape of a significant number of potentially deadly
pathogens is likely.9 " Once these microorganisms escape into the environment,

"Senator Edward Kennedy, the sponsor of S. 1217, might now question whether congressional intervention is merited at all. Kennedy has retreated from his earlier hard-line position on
DNA research, voicing the opinion that he is concerned about "the fluctuating scientific data
and the emotional atmosphere of the debate." Kennedy has withdrawn support for his own bill
and is now proposing instead compromise legislation to extend the current NIH guidelines for
one year to all parties conducting recombinant DNA research and to establish a national recombinant DNA study commission to recommend, after nine months, whether permanent legislation
is necessary. Kennedy cites new work by Stanley Cohen of Stanford University as challenging the
belief that recombinant DNA research can produce novel organisms. See Halvorson, Recombinant DNA Legislation-What Next?, 198 Science 357 (1977).
4See Grobstein, supra note 18, at 1134.
I5 GooDFIELD. supra note 4, at 4.
"See TIME, Aug. 15, 1977, at 56.
52R.

CURTISS.

GENETIC MANIPULATION

OF MICROORGANISMS:

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

AND

BIOHAzARVs 37 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CURTISS].
Estimating the number of virus vectors or hosts that might escape per day per investigation for a properly operated P1 facility is difficult, but let me guess at a value of
101. If we then assume 1,000 investigators working on 300 days per year, then 3 x 1010
will escape from P1 facilities, 3 x 107 from P2 facilities and 3 x 104 from P3 facilities.
These routes of escape will be by contamination of the investigator (on clothing or by
breathing or ingestion), by discharge through the ventilation system, by removal of
floor sweepings and by accidental disposal down the drain.
Id.
A member of the NIH committee which drafted the guidelines, Curtiss only recently
changed his position on the possible health hazards of DNA from one of greater to lesser concern. In a widely circulated letter to the director of NIH, Curtiss wrote: "I have gradually come
to the realization that the introduction of foreign DNA sequences into certain host-vectors offers
no danger whatsoever to any human being," except in very special circumstances. "The arrival at
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they cannot be recalled; "[b]y the time a sufficient number of people get sick
to make one suspect trouble, the organism[s] will have spread far and
wide." 3
Calculation of escape probabilities presumes that investigators and other
personnel understand the operation of the containment devices sufficiently
well to minimize mistakes. But many microbiologists, either purposely"1 or
from lack of knowledge, will not utilize the laboratory facilities and procedures properly.55 As a consequence, even more potentially dangerous
altered cells could escape undetected into the environment, though the
microorganisms would have to overcome nearly insurmountable obstacles in
order to pose a disease threat. 5 A myriad of human errors will undoubtedly
occur as the scope of genetic research widens and only stringent safety
precautions will minimize the ecological impact of laboratory mistakes. So as
to forestall even the remote possibility of a scientifically produced epidemic,
Congress must establish a mandatory cut-off date after which E coli and its
57
laboratory strains cannot be used in federally licensed DNA facilities.
Legislation should empower the government to revoke the operating license of
this conclusion has ben somewhat painful and with reluctance since it is contrary to my past 'feelings' about the biohazards of recombinant DNA research." Gene Splicing: Senate Bill Draws
Charges of Lysenkoism, 197,ScIEmCE 348 (1977).
3
" Hubbard, supra note 7, at 611.
54A questionable breach of NIH rules on gene splicing occurred in 1977 in the Department
of Biochemistry and Biophysics at the University of California, San Francisco, one of the leading
centers for the practice of the DNA technique. No hazard resulted, but the episode underlines
some of the difficulties experienced by research laboratories in adapting to the new rules.
The breach was the use of a biological component before it had been certified by the NIH
director. Another incident demonstrating that some workers still lag behind their new public accountability was pointed out:
One Ph.D. candidate visited from another university this week and did experiments
with a disease-causing bacterial strain. These experiments would seem to require a
higher level of physical containment than our P1 lab affords-probably a costly type of
ventilation hood. When asked what level was specified by the guidelines, he replied,
"Damned if I know." Someone else asked, "Well, what containment level do you use at
your own lab?" He shrugged, "I never looked it up."
Hopson, supra note 19, at 61.
5
" CURTISS. supra note 52, at 38.
"Helling & Allen, Freedom of Inquiry and Scientific Responsibility, 26 BIoscIENCE 610
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Helling & Allen].
First, the [cells] would have to survive and grow in competition with other cells....
Second, the cells would have to be ingested. Third, the ingested cells would have to
survive passage to the bowel. Fourth, the cells would have to multiply in the intestine
or pass the potentially hazardous genes to another resident cell. In the latter case, the
genes would have to confer a growth advantage on the new cell or maintain themselves
by rapid replication and frequent transfer to new cells. Fifth, the gene must produce
its product. Sixth, the product must be released in active form at physiological concentration. And finally, the product must either attack the intestinal lining or pass into
internal fluids at physiological concentration.
Id.
'?Even the NIH Guidelines, supra note 2, at 27915, concede that serious attempts need to
be made to find another host-vector system. It was noted: "[W]hile proceeding cautiously with E
coli, serious efforts should be made toward developing alternative host-vector systems."
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any violating facility and withhold public funds from laboratories continuing
to use E coli. To alleviate the impact of such a prohibition, Congress should
appropriate adequate funds for discovery and testing of alternative hosts and
vectors. The federal government should direct scientific interest toward
testing of the polyoma virus, which holds promise as a potential vector. 58 Initial testing has shown that the virus probably will not infect humans, even
though it is detectable in mice. 59
But even as the government succeeds in mandating the use of safer hostvector systems in DNA research, improvement in medical supervision of
laboratories will still be required. The NIH guidelines now vest in a principal
facility investigator 0 the responsibility for implementing precautionary
medical procedures, a system wholly inadequate to the safety challenges
presented. While the facility investigator exercises a broad oversight function,
he apparently does not have to engage in strictly routine experimental operations on a regular basis; as a consequence, scientists could conceivably conduct hazardous experiments without restrictive supervision and thereby expose
themselves to hazards for which immediate medical help is unavailable.
Instead of adopting the NIH approach to oversight, permanent DNA
legislation should make provisions for placement of all laboratory personnel
under the surveillance of a facility medical officer whose duties are clearly
delineated. 61 This officer would work in conjunction with the facility's
biological safety officer, another legislatively created position. The safety officer would (1) enforce a facility code of practice (based upon the national
regulations when are they promulgated), 6 (2) conduct all aspects of training,
(3) investigate and report accidents, (4) make provisions for the safe storage
and transportation of materials, (5) maintain an inventory, (6) provide
laboratory security and (7) oversee the maintenance of laboratory
equipment." The safety officer would also formulate an appropriate plan of
action which would become operational in the event of an accidental spill of
recombinant DNA or a viral vector containing it.
The initial uncertainty surrounding genetic engineering makes the implementation of such safety procedures necessary. But these measures, even
when coupled with the physical and biological safeguards set forth in the
NIH guidelines, may not afford adequate protection to the American public."5See id. at 27919.
"See id. at 27924.
60

EMBO Standing Committee, supra note 6, at 8.

"See id.
621n issuing a facility license, government officials (or their designated representatives)
presumably will mandate minimum safety standards which must be met by researchers.
The safety officer, as envisioned, would oversee laboratory work and, theoretically, his
presence would discourage deviation from legislatively authorized experimental practices. Under
the proposal made here retention of the government-granted license would depend, to a significant degree, upon the integrity of the safety officer and the vigor with which he pursues his
responsibilities.
OsMany of these responsibilities are vested currently in the principal investigator.
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As a consequence, Congress should set "P3 containment" as the minimum
level under which scientists can conduct future DNA experiments, at least until testing establishes conclusively that no major health hazards exist. Use of
P3 laboratories, which are technically more sophisticated than other
facilities"' and highly effective in containment of microorganisms, would
generally permit closer government scrutiny and analysis of existing projects
during the crucial early days of DNA experimentation.
Congress should also recognize the necessity of confining all inherently
dangerous P4 experiments to a single national laboratory.6 s This would include all recombinant DNA research involving transcension of species boundaries. 6 Notwithstanding predictable protest by members of the scientific
community, Congress should designate the center as a top security facility,
primarily because terrorists could conceivably use the DNA technology in
preparation of military weapons. Opponents of such security procedures
might well argue that any terrorist able to use the sophisticated DNA procedures would opt instead for proven agents from nature's. arsenal, such as
smallpox or plague, rather than spending years attempting to develop a
biological weapon of dubious effectiveness. But terrorists would not only obtain the ingredients to produce disease of incomprehensible scope but the
mode by which to incite world calamity; fear of the unknown is precisely the
element making DNA-produced diseases so formidable.
Congress should also take steps to proscribe the intentional release of
genetically altered cells into the environment.6 7 Commercial developers have
"It is estimated that the number of escaped viral vectors is reduced about 1,000-fold for
each increasing level of containment starting at P1. W. Emmett Barkley, in his capacity as director of research safety of the National Cancer Institute, has even gone on record as saying that the
most highly contagious biological agents may be used in P3 laboratories with minimal risk.
Barkley estimates that, on the average, workers in P3 laboratories incur about two infections for
every 100 person-years of work-and this is with the most highly infectuous agents known.
Ptashne, supra note 9, at 31.
"But as is noted in Helling & Allen, supra note 56, at 611,
[P41 is known from long experience at Fort Detrick to offer no absolute barriers
against the escape of pathogenic organisms. Microbiological techniques were devised to
keep contaminating organisms out of one's experiments, not to keep organisms one
works with in, for that cannot be done in an absolute sense.
Further, HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 13, at 40, stated:
Studies have been made to determine the extent of accidental infection within such
highly secure and tightly controlled facilities as the former biological warfare research
laboratory at Ft. Detrick, Maryland. These studies have shown that while the incidence
of infection leading to either morbidity or mortality has been relatively low, it has occurred frequently enough to demonstrate that the best of the systems is not one hundred percent fail-safe. In these instances, a large portion of the infections were the
result of human failure to comply with safety requirements.
sThe nub of the new technology is to move genes back and forth, not only across species
lines, but across any boundaries that now divide living organisms, particularly the most fundamental such boundary, that which divides prokaryotes (bacteria and bluegreen algae) from
eukaryotes (those cells with a distinct nucleus in higher plants and animals).
"See CuRTiss. supra note 52, at 53, where the researcher notes: "I consider such release
anytime in the near future to be potentially quite hazardous."
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already begun expansive testing of a variety of marketable organisms which
could ultimately have a substantial impact on the eco-system. 68
In formulating controls over the intentional release of bacterial mutants
with unpredictable capabilities, Congress should also recognize the international import of freeing genetically altered cells; release in the United States
is a de facto release in all other countries.
If Congress fails to pass DNA legislation, 9 the individual states should
proceed with the drafting and promulgation of rigorous regulatory standards.
State guidelines are imperative and appropriate because universities, which
now house most DNA research projects, generally must account solely to the
legislature. Universities owe little, if any, statutory allegiance to the communities in which they operate. 0
In the absence of more objectively formulated standards, a state seeking
to resolve the agonizing technical problems posed by DNA experimentation
should build its regulatory framework around the NIH guidelines. Most state
governments lack both the technical input and the requisite available fmancing to draft independent DNA safeguards even approaching those laid down
by the NIH. However, in formulating a state regulatory system, officials
should view the NIH guidelines as minimum, not maximum, regulatory standards. Further, the state legislature should augment the NIH provisions by
insistence upon extensive training of laboratory employees; by mandating
periodic, yet unscheduled, inspections of DNA facilities by independent
analysts familiar with microorganic containment procedures; and by requiring strict accountability by genetic researchers to top officials of the state
health board.
CONCLUSION

Since the inception of genetic research, scientists and legal theorists have
pondered the technical71 and ethical questions posed by this new technology.
"General Electric, for example, is reportedly trying to patent a newly assembled strain of
pseudomonas bacteria that can wholly digest crude oil, such as might result from an oceanic
spill. It was developed by GE researchers by transferring plasmids from several strains, each of
which would digest oil partially, into a single strain that can do the whole job. But how will the
strain attack oil that has not spilled-petroleum still in the ground or in storage? Can this
organism be kept from destroying oil we want to use?
"In the absence of a statutory remedy for injury, a plaintiff could arguably sue in tort for
DNA-related injuries. In Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), Judge Blackburn
established a basis for judgments in similar cases in both Britain and American ever since. The
ruling states that if for your own purposes you collect any material on your land that might
damage people if the material escaped, and if it does escape and cause damage, then you are
liable-even though it was not your negligence that led to its escape in the first place.
70In Indiana, -for example, local personal property taxes cannot be levied on state-owned
lands, i.e., public university property. See 1944 ATrY GEN. ANN. REP. 11. See also Russell v.
Trustees of Purdue University, 201 Ind. 367, 374, 168 N.E. 529, 531 (1929), where it was said
that when incorporated universities exist which are founded and supported by the state, they are
generally treated by the courts as public rather than private corporations.
"In the case of the DNA issue, the research is moving so fast that it is difficult to maintain an awareness of the status of the development. The rewards and . . . incentives

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:571

But while the initial regulatory response to the problem has been wellintentioned, Congress now has a moral responsibility to impose circumscriptive experimental standards to safeguard the public health.
Federal law-makers will likely refuse, however, to transform their
theoretical concerns about DNA hazards into restrictive legislative policies and
will succumb instead to the lobbying efforts of financially interested corporations and the organized scientific community. Such government inaction
would further erode public confidence in Congress as a concerned legal institution and needlessly expose the population to the potentiality of genetic
disaster.
Should Congress fail to act, the individual state legislatures must proceed
to adopt their own regulatory safeguards, using the NIH guidelines as
minimum safety standards.
TERRY L. ENGLISH

for success in research in this area are extremely high for commercial developers and
researchers alike. The risk in some instances can be partially defined but in most cases
are highly speculative. Since most of the research is being supported by Federal funds,
there is a considerable political challenge to maintain an awareness sufficient to exercise control over policy. At the same time, there has always been considerable
resistance, from the basic research community, against any infringement upon the
historic rights of academic freedom and the search for basic knowledge. HUMAN
GENErcs, supra note 13, at 19.

